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CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CREDITOR COMPOSITION,
AND INSOLVENCY LAW IN JAPAN
Benjamin T. Jones†
Abstract: This article identifies potential relationships between the
methods by which large firms in the business sector are externally financed and
creditors’ determinations to resolve business failure through private negotiation
or formal insolvency proceedings. Prior to the deregulation of Japan’s capital
markets in the 1980s, large firms relied heavily on bank debt as a source of
external capital. Consequently, their capital structures and their creditor
compositions were relatively homogenous. Japanese banks appeared to primarily
resolve the failure of their borrowers through private reorganizations or
liquidations rather than court proceedings, and evidence suggests that creditor
homogeneity was a favorable condition for the negotiated resolution of business
failure. Japan’s corporate insolvency laws were used relatively infrequently and
suffered from procedural and substantive defects that likely discouraged their use.

The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets in the 1980s enabled large
firms to raise debt capital by issuing bonds, which over time resulted in the
diversification of firm capital structures and creditor compositions. This had
significant consequences for the ability of creditors to negotiate the resolution of
their borrowers’ business failure. Japan’s long recession in the 1990s pushed
many firms close to insolvency, yet it appears that changes in capital structure
and creditor composition adversely affected the availability of negotiated
resolution of business failure, and Japan’s insolvency laws remained problematic.
This article suggests that Japanese banks developed unusual and seemingly
irrational lending strategies for distressed borrowers, given their inability to
resolve business failure through private negotiations or formal insolvency
proceedings. At the turn of the century, the Japanese legal community
spearheaded significant reforms of Japan’s insolvency laws, and a prolonged
surge in filing rates indicates that creditors quickly seized upon legal reforms to
force reorganization of distressed borrowers. While this article’s findings are
preliminary, it represents an agenda for further research on this topic.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The American appellate judge and legal scholar Frank Easterbrook
observed that “[w]hen we see creditors resort to bankruptcy, they are telling
us that the legal process is superior to market methods available to them.”1
†
The author is an associate in the Jones Day Global Disputes Practice. The contents of this Article
reflect his own opinions, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the firm or its clients. The author
would like to thank Professors John O. Haley, Mark Ramseyer , Zenichi Shishido, and Harry N. Scheiber
for their invaluable mentorship and guidance, as well as David Cromwell and the editorial staff of the
Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their tireless efforts and commitment to excellence. Finally, the
author would like to thank his family, without whom none of this would be possible. This article is
intended to serve as a research agenda for further empirical work.
1
Frank Easterbrook, Is Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411, 417 (1990).
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This observation resonates in the context of Japan, where until recently
corporate insolvencies were infrequently resolved through formal legal
proceedings and creditors seemingly preferred to rely on market methods,
such as negotiated resolution of business failure. Recent trends in corporate
bankruptcy filings following major legal reforms suggest that the legal
process has become relatively more valuable to creditors in resolving
Japanese business failure.2 This article highlights a major factor behind the
recent gravitation of Japanese creditors to the use of the legal process in the
resolution of business failure: limitations on the effectiveness of private
restructuring imposed by increasingly complex creditor compositions.
Trends in the resolution of business failure from the high-growth
period to the past decade suggest that market methods, such as private
reorganizations and liquidations, were the dominant means by which
creditors negotiated the resolution of business failure. However, during
Japan’s long recession in the 1990s, market methods became relatively less
effective in resolving business failure. Indeed, Japanese banks lent heavily
to many distressed firms during that decade, rather than negotiate the
restructuring or liquidation of such firms. Creditors appeared reluctant to
push distressed firms into formal insolvency proceedings. Finally, major
insolvency law reforms at the turn of the century resulted in an
unprecedented boom in insolvency filings, as creditors pushed tens of
thousands of distressed debtors into formal reorganization proceedings.3
This shift, when viewed through the lens of Japanese corporate
finance, suggests a relationship between the capital structure and creditor
composition of large Japanese firms and the availability of market methods
to resolve business failure. Where large Japanese firms raised capital
primarily by borrowing from banks and where creditor composition was
relatively homogenous, creditors appeared to rely on market methods more
frequently than on legal process. The deregulation of Japan’s capital
markets in the late 1970s and 1980s enabled large firms to issue bonds in
domestic and overseas capital markets, and resulted in the diversification of
firm capital structures and creditor compositions. Throughout Japan’s
prolonged recession in the 1990s, market methods fell short of enabling
creditors to privately resolve business failure, and existing substantive and
procedural defects in Japan’s insolvency laws continued to discourage the
use of legal process. Therefore, insolvency law reforms may have enabled
2

Kent Anderson, Japanese Insolvency Law After a Decade of Reform, 42 CAN. BUS. L.J. 2, 7

(2006).
3

Id. at 16.
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diverse classes of creditors to resolve business failure through the legal
process.
This analysis is structured chronologically, and attempts to relate
developments in Japan’s capital markets and the methods by which market
participants resolved business failure. Accordingly, this article is organized
into eight parts, as described below.
Part II reviews the factors that led large Japanese firms to rely
primarily on bank debt as an external source of capital during Japan’s
economic modernization in the period ranging roughly from the 1950s to the
1970s. Part III discusses the private restructuring of Toyo Kogyo,
identifying potential lessons regarding the significance of capital structure
and creditor composition to the ability to resolve business failure through
market methods. Part IV surveys prior scholarship on Japan’s insolvency
laws, private reorganizations, and liquidations, and explains why market
methods were seemingly preferable to legal process where capital structures
and creditor compositions were relatively homogenous. Part V describes the
deregulation of Japan’s capital markets in the 1980s, and suggests that this
deregulation changed the capital structures and creditor compositions of
large firms, with consequences for Japanese banks and implications for the
resolution of business failure through use of market methods.
Part VI identifies possible barriers to the use of market methods and
legal processes to resolve business failure during Japan’s prolonged
recession in the 1990s, and suggests that banks consequently developed
seemingly irrational lending strategies for distressed firms to forestall
insolvency. Part VII describes the insolvency law reforms that took effect in
2000, which resolved substantive and procedural deficiencies and enabled
creditors to rely on legal process to restructure tens of thousands of
distressed firms in the early 2000s. While further empirical work is
necessary, Part VIII offers a tentative conclusion, suggesting possible
relationships between capital structure, creditor composition, and the choice
between market methods and legal process to resolve business failure.
II.

THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF LARGE JAPANESE FIRMS: 1950S -1970S

During Japan’s high-growth, post-war economy, falling roughly
between the 1950s and the 1970s, bank debt was the dominant source of
external finance for large Japanese firms.4 As discussed below, this reliance
4
Curtis J. Milhaupt, On the (Fleeting) Existence of the Main Bank System and Other Japanese
Economic Institutions, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 425, 430-31 (2002); see also Sadahiko Suzuki & Richard
W. Wright, Financial Structure and Bankruptcy Risk in Japanese Companies, 16 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 97
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upon bank debt arose from a confluence of factors, including: the main bank
system, the role of Japanese bureaucracy in allocating scarce capital towards
the development of export industries, and commercial laws that made it
expensive and difficult for Japanese firms to raise funds through the capital
markets by privileging banks as providers of debt capital.
A.

Main Bank System

Scholars of Japanese business have identified a post-war model of
corporate finance characterized as the “main bank” system, in which large
firms borrowed from a syndicate of lenders headed by a main bank, which
was the bank with the largest share of loans to the firm.5 Under the main
bank system, Japanese firms often developed a long-term borrowing
relationship with a dominant lender, frequently but by no means exclusively
situated within the same industrial group. 6 While a large Japanese firm
would borrow from a syndicate of lenders, the main bank would often
provide a substantially larger proportion of loan capital than other lenders.7
Moreover, these loans were accompanied by long-term, cross-shareholdings
between bank and borrower, which reaffirmed the stability of the lending
relationship.8
Main banks monitored their borrowers, sometime by appointing bank
directors to the boards of troubled borrowers, and there is evidence that main
banks would share information with the a distressed borrower’s other
lenders, reducing information asymmetries between lenders and enabling a
coordinated approach to restructuring the debt obligations of a borrower.9
Finally, some scholars have argued that these main banks provided
borrowers implicit rescue guarantees, charging above-market interest rates
on loans when the borrower was in good financial health in order to

(1985) (in Japanese firms, it is common for borrowed funds to exceed owners’ equity by a factor of six);
Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, & David Scharfstein, Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the
Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships, in ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION,
CORPORATE FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 105 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1990) [hereinafter Bank Monitoring
and Investment].
5
Masahiko Aoki, Hugh Patrick, & Paul Sheard, The Japanese Main Bank System: An Introductory
Overview, in THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM 6 (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick eds., 1994).
6
Id. at 5-6.
7
Id. at 6.
8
Id. at 12.
9
Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap, & David Scharfstein, The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of
Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 68, 69 (1990) [hereinafter The Role of Banks]; Aoki, Patrick
& Sheard, supra note 5, at 24.
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compensate the bank for its rescue costs when the firm’s financial health
suffered.10
Under this system, bank rescue operations were ad hoc in nature and
varied in form, but rescue operations generally had one or more of the
following consequences: 1) reduction of required principal and interest
payments on outstanding loans, 2) extension of the maturity dates on loans,
and 3) exchange of debt for an equity stake in the firm.11 Additionally, there
is evidence that appointments of bankers to firm boards came largely in
response to poor liquidity and cash flow problems, and that the liquidity of
the distressed firm increased following the banker appointment.12
B.

Administrative Guidance and Capital Allocation Policies

Government capital allocation policies also encouraged a bank debtheavy capital structure.
During the high growth period, Japanese
bureaucrats sought to allocate scarce capital to the development of infant
industries for global export.13 Government policies encouraged high rates of
personal savings, enabling commercial and state-supported banks to direct
credit to target industries. 14 Additionally, stable sources of bank lending
facilitated trade credit between suppliers and manufacturers within an
industry, which was a vital component of the capital structure of the
Japanese firm. 15 This bureaucratic policymaking did not just encourage
10

Randall Morck & Masao Nakamura, Banks and Corporate Control in Japan, 54 J. FIN. 319, 321

(1999).
11

Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 103. Yoshiro Miwa and Mark Ramseyer have challenged the
traditional account of implicit bank rescue guarantees, arguing that banks chose whether to pursue private
restructuring on an ad hoc basis, and that bank monitoring, which often consisted of appointing retired bank
directors to a troubled borrower’s board of directors, did not constitute effective monitoring. See Yoshiro
Miwa & Mark Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies: The Problem of Bank Rescues, 6
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 301, 302 (2005). They claim that creditors may sometimes choose to rescue a firm in
order to maximize debt recovery, but that banks certainly were not bound by an implicit rescue guarantee.
Id. Ad hoc recovery-maximizing decisions by banks are consistent with the observed consequences of
those rescue operations that did occur.
12
Morck & Nakamura, supra note 10, at 336 (reporting that banker appointments follow decline in
liquidity and cash flow, and that liquidity is enhanced in the years following bank intervention); Bank
Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 107 (finding that the investment behavior of firms which
weakened bank ties during the 1980s in favor of greater reliance on the bond markets appears more
liquidity-constrained than firms that stayed more reliant upon banks).
13
See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 (1982).
14
Id. at 15; see also Yoshiro Miwa & Mark Ramseyer, Directed Credit? The Loan Market in HighGrowth Japan, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 171, 176 (2004) [hereinafter Miwa & Ramseyer, Directed
Credit?] (providing a critical account of the scholarly literature on credit rationing).
15
ULRIKE SCHAEDE, CHOOSE AND FOCUS: JAPANESE BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
57 (2008); Christopher W. Anderson & Anil K. Makhija, Deregulation, Disintermediation, and Agency
Costs of Debt: Evidence from Japan, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 314 (1999)
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targeted lending, but provided banks with greater information about the
prospects of their borrowers, reducing the uncertainty costs associated with
financing new industrial ventures.16
C.

Capital Market Regulations

Regulatory restrictions on Japan’s capital markets restrained
competition among providers of capital, further emphasizing the importance
of bank debt. While Japan had functioning equity markets from the 1950s
onwards, numerous regulatory restrictions undermined the growth of these
markets.17 First, Japanese shares issued at par value rather than at market
value, limiting the capacity of Japanese firms to capture returns on equity
issuance.18 Equity holdings in the high-growth years consisted in significant
part of cross-shareholdings between a firm, its lenders, and trading partners,
and cross-shareholdings were generally illiquid and oriented towards
preservation of long-term business relationships rather than the
maximization of investment return.19 To compensate shareholders for tying
up their capital in illiquid shareholding arrangements, issuers customarily
paid annual dividends at a fractional percentage of par value, regardless of
firm performance.20 The Foreign Capital Law restricted foreign ownership
of Japanese equity securities, limited demand and trading volumes, and
prevented foreign institutional investors from pressuring Japanese issuers to
increase returns on equity.21
Japanese law prohibited the issuance of unsecured corporate debt,
which constrained the market for corporate debt securities.22 Moreover, the
Bond Issuance Committee (“Bond Committee”), comprised of major
Japanese financial institutions, held a monopoly on the appointment of bond
trustees to oversee the management of collateral against which corporate
bonds were issued. 23 The Bond Committee performed credit ratings to
16

SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 56 (MITI-sponsored research consortia diffused information about
early-stage technologies among leading firms, indirectly upholding industry hierarchies and channeling
investment among firms towards promising technologies).
17
Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 100.
18
Id.
19
Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 429; Aoki, Patrick, & Sheard, supra note 5, at 12-14.
20
Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 100.
21
SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 53. Additionally, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law gave the Ministry of International Trade and Industry the authority to regulate all cross-border
transactions. Id.
22
Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 313.
23
TAKEO HOSHI, ANIL KASHYAP, & DAVID SCHARFSTEIN, THE CHOICE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE DEBT: AN ANALYSIS OF POST-DEREGULATION CORPORATE FINANCING IN JAPAN 12-13 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4421, 1993) [hereinafter PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT].
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determine which firms were permitted to issue bonds, using capital ratio
criteria heavily weighted towards Japan’s largest industrial companies. 24
The Bond Committee also dictated the interest rates and maturity date of
bond issues, and trustee banks were by far the largest purchasers of bonds,
purchasing on average 63.4% of the bonds issued during the 1960s.25 Banks
were well positioned to limit the volume of bonds issued and to ensure that
their lending practices were left unchallenged, and bonds were issued almost
exclusively to the same group of firms that already had access to bank
debt.26
Some scholars have suggested that, in return for their privileged role
as a source of capital, banks were implicitly obligated to rescue distressed
borrowers rather than let them fail. 27 In their scholarship, Miwa and
Ramseyer argue that banks determined on an ad hoc basis whether to rescue
troubled borrowers, and were certainly not bound by an implicit rescue
guarantee. While banks did not always rescue troubled borrowers, banks
sometimes rescued such borrowers, and the rescue of Toyo Kogyo (better
known as the manufacturer of Mazda automobiles) by Sumitomo Bank in
1974 is illustrative of the powerful role that bank finance vested in Japanese
financial institutions.
III.

CASE STUDY: THE TOYO KOGYO BAILOUT

Pascale and Rohlen’s account of the bank-led private reorganization of
Toyo Kogyo, the manufacturer of Mazda automobiles, is an illustration of
the role that Japanese banks played in resolving the financial distress of their
largest borrowers. This Part recounts Pascale and Rohlen’s major findings
and discusses those findings in the light of subsequent scholarship.
Pascale & Rohlen provide a richly detailed case study of bank
intervention in the operations of a financially distressed firm.28 Although
Toyo Kogyo successfully diversified from its core truck manufacturing
operation to the production of passenger cars in the 1960s, the firm lost a
significant domestic and international market share in the early 1970s.29 By
1974, Toyo Kogyo was teetering on the brink of insolvency, with seventythree lending institutions financing the firm’s operation, led by Sumitomo
24
Id.; Eric Grouse, Banks, Bonds, and Risk: The Mycal Bankruptcy and its Repercussions for the
Japanese Bond Market, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 571, 591 (2002).
25
Grouse, supra note 24, at 591.
26
Id. As Grouse notes, the banks composing the Bond Committee were uninterested in allowing the
market for corporate bonds to disrupt their lending business. Id. at 592.
27
Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 102.
28
Richard Pascale & Thomas P. Rohlen, The Mazda Turnaround, 9 J. JAP. STUD. 219 (1983).
29
Id. at 222-23.
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Bank and Sumitomo Trust Bank.30 Sumitomo Bank alone had an exposure
of $234 million to Toyo Kogyo, and Hiroshima Bank, another large lender,
was funding both Toyo Kogyo and many of its local suppliers. The troubled
firm was relying on bank loans to meet its debt and trade finance
obligations. In early 1974, Sumitomo increased its monitoring of the
troubled borrower, placing a team of seven bank executives in Toyo Kogyo
to supervise its operations.31
In late 1974, Sumitomo Bank formally intervened, calling a meeting
of the firm’s creditors and announcing its support for Toyo Kogyo, and
designating a Sumitomo financial subsidiary to provide bridge financing for
the firm’s short-term obligations. 32 Sumitomo also declared that its
executives would lead an internal restructuring of Toyo Kogyo. 33 The
bank’s display of support consolidated resolve among lenders, and no
lenders called in loans for expedited repayment or refused to turn over
existing debt obligations as they came due.34 Additionally, lenders carried
promissory notes issued by Toyo Kogyo to its suppliers in 1975, enabling
Toyo to finance its ongoing operations.35
As Pascale and Rohlen observe, the support of Toyo Kogyo’s creditors
to the bank-led restructuring plan meant that the costs incurred by creditor
resistance in the 1979 Chrysler bailout were avoided, allowing management
and lenders to focus on restructuring rather than on political or legal
battles. 36 Additionally, the bank’s role in mobilizing creditor support
enabled restructuring plans to move forward without reliance on government
loan guarantees; Sumitomo’s declared willingness to backstop other
creditor’s losses at Toyo Kogyo diminished the need for the government to
play an active role in the bailout operations.37
In contrast, Chrysler had around a dozen sets of institutional lenders—
including banks in the U.S., Canada, Europe, Japan, Asia, and the Middle
East—and six issues of publicly-held, unsecured debentures totaling over
$400 million, and Chrysler’s financial subsidiary, Chrysler Financial
Corporation, had substantially greater debt outstanding, all of which was
30

Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 230.
36
Id.; see also Paul H. Wilson, Jr. & Peter L. Borowitz, Working Out With the Government: The
Chrysler Loan Guarantee Program, 4 J. L. & COM. 19 (1984) (discussing Chrysler’s struggles with its
creditors and the U.S. government as it sought to restructure its debt in 1979).
37
Pascale & Rohlen, supra note 28, at 230 (discussing the different roles that national government
played in the Toyo Kogyo and Chrysler bailouts).
31
32
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unsecured.38 Chrysler’s management spent more than a year fighting the
firm’s institutional lenders, while seeking government loan guarantee
assistance from Congress and the Ford Administration before management
could fully focus on restructuring the distressed firm. 39 Without a single
large creditor to coordinate the reorganization and discipline other creditors,
Chrysler was vulnerable to sporadic creditor defections. Canadian banks set
off their claims against accounts of Chrysler’s Canadian subsidiary; a
European creditor temporarily set off its claims against funds transferred to
Chrysler through that account; creditors initiated litigation against Chrysler
in several U.S. states; Japanese banks refused to extend additional letters of
credit financing for Chrysler’s imports of Mitsubishi vehicles.40
Creditor resistance may have also represented tensions between
lenders. As Wilson and Borowitz observe, Chrysler’s domestic lenders took
the position that all banks should be subject to equal sacrifices, while foreign
lenders viewed the Chrysler restructuring as primarily a U.S. problem,
requiring only domestic lenders to make greater financial sacrifices.41 While
Chrysler’s lenders ultimately reached agreement on the restructuring
arrangements, the process proved challenging.42
After shoring up the stability of Toyo Kogyo’s relationships with its
borrowers, Sumitomo’s executive team forced out the troubled firm’s
incumbent management and relied on local business leaders to appoint a
successor capable of brokering a deal with the firm’s suppliers and labor
union. 43 Union negotiations led to the rescheduling of year-end bonus
payments and the creation of a dispatched worker program that preserved
union jobs while imposing cuts in vehicle production by turning production
workers into traveling salesmen.44 Negotiations with suppliers resulted in
supplier price cuts.45
While full recovery took several years, Sumitomo’s initial display of
support was vital to improving Toyo Kogyo’s cash flow and stabilizing its
existing credit lines.46 The bank’s executives had no particular expertise in
auto manufacturing, but bank-led intervention was likely instrumental in
preventing creditor panic and forcing suppliers and labor unions to accept
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Wilson & Borowitz, supra note 36, at 24.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 31.
Id.
Pascale & Rohlen, supra note 28, at 238, 345.
Id. at 239.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 257.
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cost reduction measures.47 Bank-led intervention may have also prevented
unilateral action by creditors to accelerate repayment of outstanding debt or
foreclose against collateral, and may have reduced informational
asymmetries between creditors as the lead creditor in the restructuring
communicated with other creditors of the firm. 48 It seems plausible that
banks also had reputational incentives to avoid unilaterally seeking
repayment, since they often participated in lending syndicates. A unilateral
call for repayment to the detriment of other lenders in the syndicate could
potentially result in retaliation by other banks with respect to other
syndicated loans.
As mentioned before, Miwa and Ramseyer wisely caution against
reading too much from the Toyo Kogyo case study. Specifically, they
observe that the Toyo Kogyo case study does not necessarily indicate that
banks were skillful turnaround managers.49 Rather, the Toyo Kogyo case
study suggests that where creditors are able to negotiate a private
restructuring, formal legal process can be avoided.
Questions remain regarding the motivations of creditors to bear the
costs and risks of private restructuring when formal insolvency procedures
are available. Is the bank-led private reorganization of Toyo Kogyo the
exception or the rule when it comes to corporate insolvency? In other words,
do bailouts prevail over bankruptcies, and if so, why? Part IV proposes that
large lenders and troubled borrowers may prefer private resolution of
business failure to formal insolvency proceedings, and that this preference
resulted from a combination of bank debt-heavy capital structures and
substantive and procedural defects in Japan’s insolvency laws.
BAILOUTS OVER BANKRUPTCIES: CAPITAL STRUCTURE, BANKRUPTCY
LAW, AND THE PREFERENCE FOR PRIVATE RESTRUCTURING IN JAPAN

IV.

As previously discussed, both Toyo Kogyo and Chrysler kept out of
bankruptcy court, but the former spent far fewer resources than the latter to
achieve the same outcome.50 The bank debt-heavy capital structure of Toyo
Kogyo resulted in a relatively small number of bank creditors that, alongside
procedural and substantive defects in Japan’s insolvency laws, may have
contributed to this story. Judge Easterbrook tells us that creditors’ choice of
47

Id.
Id. at 229-30.
49
Miwa & Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies, supra note 11, at 309-10.
50
Wilson & Borowitz, supra note 36, at 33 (noting that Chrysler’s former CEO, Lee Iacocca, once
stated that the government loan guarantee program had cost Chrysler one dollar in lost car sales and legal
expenses for every two dollars it borrowed with loan guarantees).
48
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bankruptcy proceedings demonstrates the superiority of legal process over
market methods; conversely, where creditors prefer private negotiation to
bankruptcy proceedings, this suggests that market methods are superior to
the legal process available to them. The insolvency laws available to
creditors likely influenced creditor preferences for market methods.
As discussed in this section, formal insolvency proceedings were
relatively infrequently used, and suffered from both substantive and
procedural defects. Bank-led private restructurings and trade creditor-led
private liquidations were more frequently used, and both such mechanisms
enabled creditors and borrowers to stay out of court.
A.

Japanese Bankruptcy Law

Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, creditors in the U.S. face two basic
procedural options:
a liquidation procedure (Chapter 7) 51 and a
reorganization procedure (Chapter 11). 52 Toyo Kogyo’s creditors, on the
other hand, would have found themselves confronted with five types of
corporate insolvency procedures, including two types of liquidation
procedures 53 –Bankruptcy (Hasan) 54 and Special Liquidation (Tokubetsu
Seisan) 55 –and three types of reorganization procedures: Corporate
51

11 U.S.C. § 701 (1986).
11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1978).
53
FRANK PACKER & MARK RYSER, THE GOVERNANCE OF FAILURE: AN ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY IN JAPAN (Ctr. on Japanese Econ. and Bus., Columbia Graduate Sch. of Bus., Working Paper
No. 62, 1992). Packer and Ryser also identified two categories of business failure which do not fall under
bankruptcy in the legal sense. First, there is “Internal Arrangement” (Uchi Seiri) which contains those
firms for which a formal creditors’ meeting was held and there was an unanimous agreement aimed at the
continuation of the company (although this only applies to small and medium-sized firms and is distinct
from private workouts at large Japanese firms); and “Suspension of Bank Transactions,” a liquidationforcing option by which firms whose promissory notes are dishonored twice at a local clearinghouse in a
six-month period are subject to suspension of all current account transactions and loans by member banks
for a two-year period. Packer and Ryser find that no firm has ever survived the enactment of “Suspension
of Bank Transactions.” Id. at 4-6.
54
The Bankruptcy procedure was modeled on the 1923 German civil code, and was revised in 1952
to reflect American concepts of corporation law and the provision of discharge. Id. at 32. Application
could be made by either the debtor or creditors, and the court would render an adjudication only if it was
proven that the debtor was either incapable of covering its indebtedness, or had an excess of liabilities over
assets. Id. As the authors note, this was often established through submission of a dishonored promissory
note to the court. Id. Advance payment of costs was required under the procedure, and the payment
required was scaled to the debtor’s liabilities. Id. The court would typically issue an order for preservative
measures immediately following the filing of the application, provisionally attaching the debtor’s inventory
and enjoining the debtor from making payments. Id. Secured creditors were capable of exercising their
security rights outside of bankruptcy. Id.
55
The Special Liquidation procedure was first introduced into Japan’s Commercial Code in 1938,
and was limited to stock companies already in the process of liquidation under the bankruptcy procedure.
Id. at 33. The special liquidation procedure recognized a broader set of acceptable causes, including where
“it is deemed that circumstances exist which would seriously impede the carrying out of the liquidation,”
52
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Reorganization (Kaisha Kosei), 56 Corporate Arrangement (Kaisha Seiri),57
and Composition (Wagi).58
Packer and Ryser characterize Japanese bankruptcy law as “an array
of strong proceedings, whereby the court is given powers to step in to settle
a wide spectrum of financial recontracting problems, in combination with an
which has been interpreted to mean cases where multiple creditors “make the successful operation of
ordinary liquidation difficult.” Id. at 34. While the court may have issued preservation measures through
the bankruptcy proceeding, Packer and Ryser suggest that the additional preservation measures available
through special liquidation were unlikely to prevent a creditor panic, since the firm’s shareholders were
required to accept a resolution to dissolve the company under the bankruptcy procedure prior to initiation
of special liquidation, and notice of the resolution was given two weeks prior to the vote. Id.
56
The Corporate Reorganization procedure was introduced in 1952 and modeled after Chapter 10 of
the 1938 United States Bankruptcy Act. Corporate reorganization was available to stock companies for
which there was “the prospect of rehabilitation,” and an application could be filed upon the danger of
insolvency or excess liabilities, or where the debtor was unable to pay its obligations “without exceedingly
impeding continuation of its business.” Id. at 38. Applications could be made by the debtor, creditors, or
shareholders with claims or shareholdings above ten percent of the debtor’s capital. Id. Advance payment
of costs was required upon application, and the costs of corporate reorganization generally exceeded those
of other reorganization proceedings. Id. The time period between the initiation of the procedure and a
court decision in favor of the commencement of reorganization generally ran between three to six months,
and a stay could not be issued against secured creditors prior to the court’s decision. Id. As Packer and
Ryser observe, the most significant distinction between Japan’s corporate reorganization procedure and the
reorganization procedure established by Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code is that under the
Japanese procedure, the debtor was not in possession of the firm. Id. Rather, the court was required to
appoint a trustee to manage the debtor’s estate, and officers, directors and owners of the debtor were
removed. Id.
57
The Corporate Arrangement procedure was introduced in 1938, and was loosely based on
procedures under U.K. and Swiss law. The procedure was developed to encourage the use of legal
proceedings by stock companies and to reduce the prevalence of questionable private settlements. Id. at 36.
The procedure could only be initiated if there was a danger of insolvency or excess liabilities. Id.
Application could be made by the debtor, a creditor or shareholder with a claim or shareholding above 10%
or 3% of the debtor’s assets, respectively. Id. Advance payment of costs was required upon application.
Id. Upon application, the court was authorized to suspend any executor process that affected the debtor’s
assets, and the court could extend the stay to secured creditors if it was “in accord with the interests of the
creditors in general.” Id. at 37.
58
The Composition procedure was introduced in 1923 and had its origins in the Austrian
Composition Code. Id. at 34. As Packer and Ryser note, some scholars believe that the composition
procedure was deemed necessary due to the severe reputational harm arising from forced composition
under bankruptcy in Japan, which was not a viable option for a debtor that sought to continue operating as a
going concern. Id. at 35. Unlike the other procedures, only debtors were eligible to file a petition for
composition, although the circumstances under which the procedure could be invoked were the same as
bankruptcy, thus limiting the procedure’s applicability to debtors on the verge of bankruptcy. Id. The
debtor was required to submit a plan for composition, and the court would then appoint a commissioner to
investigate the debtor’s finances and evaluate the feasibility of its plan, following which the court could
issue an order of commencement if it determined the plan feasible and in the best interest of creditors. Id.
While the court was authorized to order preservation measures in order to prevent creditor panic and the
suspension of bank transactions, the composition procedure did not prohibit payments to creditors outside
the proceedings, nor did preservative measures apply to secured creditors. Id. Unlike bankruptcy, the
debtor remained in possession of the firm during composition. Id. A vote of creditors was required to
accept the plan, and if the plan failed to receive acceptance by three-quarters of unsecured creditors, the
debtor would be pushed into bankruptcy. Id. at 36. Following acceptance of the plan, the court provided
no further supervision of the enforcement of the plan, and had no power under the composition procedure
to avoid fraudulent conveyances made prior to submission of the plan. Id.
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array of ‘weak’ proceedings, whereby the court’s powers are far more
limited and designed to serve more as a ‘hands-off’ approach to private
settlement.” 59 Additionally, Japanese courts made extensive use of
“gatekeeping mechanisms” to pre-screen bankruptcy filings and prevent the
These gatekeeping
abuse of protections under bankruptcy law. 60
mechanisms included: requirements for the advance payment of costs by the
debtor, the discretion to grant a stay against creditors, and various judicial
interpretations of the extent of these discretionary powers. 61 Moreover,
application to the most powerful reorganization court in Japan required the
removal of management upon the initiation of the procedure.62
Given the financial costs and rigorous procedural requirements
necessary to initiate and pursue formal insolvency proceedings, it seems
likely that Japanese bankruptcy laws discouraged many potential applicants
from initiating formal reorganization proceedings. While Easterbrook
rightly looks to the incentives of creditors to pursue market mechanisms
versus legal processes, the incentives of incumbent management in the
distressed firm should not be overlooked. As Packer and Ryser argue, these
gatekeeping mechanisms also produced the risk of “near-default costs
caused by non-optimal operating strategies taken by managers to avoid
default.”63 The potential costs of private action were lowered, however, by
the existence of private liquidation and reorganization procedures driven by
bank and trade creditors.64
B.

Bank-Led Private Reorganizations

As Packer and Ryser note, bankruptcy filings accounted for only a
very small proportion of business failures in Japan, and private liquidation
and reorganization measures constituted the dominant practices for resolving
business failure.65 As discussed below, Suzuki and Wright’s seminal study
of private reorganization identifies structural preferences for bank debtheavy capital structures that may have reduced the negotiating costs of
private reorganization relative to formal legal proceedings. Additionally,
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein’s findings indicate that the addition of non-

59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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bank bondholders to the capital structure of Japanese firms may have
increased the costs of private resolution of business failure.
Specifically, Suzuki and Wright argue that Japanese firms’ preference
for debt finance was matched by the willingness of Japanese lenders to
create long-term financing arrangements for borrowers, and to continue
lending to financially distressed borrowers.66 They identify this willingness
to lend as arising from the Bank of Japan’s (“BOJ”) tolerance of large loanout ratios (loans to deposits) through “overloans,” as well as banks’ reliance
on nondeposit sources of funds, including the BOJ’s rediscount window and
the call money market in which other financial institutions place surplus
funds.67
Because of this institutional architecture designed to promote debt
finance and bank-borrower relationships, Suzuki and Wright propose that
large Japanese firms purchase security against financial distress by ceding
control to their major lenders, either in the form of bank rescue or by
engineering mergers or takeovers.68 The authors look at three measures of
firm health–accounting measures, social importance measures, and mainbank relationship measures–and conclude that accounting measures, such as
worsening cash flow, falling profits, and increasing debt accurately describe
the approach of the firm towards financial distress, but do not predict
whether the firm will file for bankruptcy. 69 Rather, they suggest that
measures of a company’s social importance and the strength of its main bank
relationship may be more accurate indicators of a distressed firm’s chance of
survival.70
While Suzuki and Wright identify broad indicators of a distressed
firm’s survival, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein scrutinize more closely the
role of banks in mitigating the costs of financial distress. They propose that
free-rider problems reduce incentives for creditors to grant financial relief or
extend credit where creditors are numerous, since any given creditor may
feel less inclined to risk its own capital where it cannot predict the behavior
of its fellow creditors, but that these disincentives become less severe where
creditors are fewer in number.71
Large and diffuse classes of bondholders pose special challenges in
debt restructuring, since bondholders are unlikely to be well-informed about
the conditions of the distressed firm and cannot easily know whether it is in
66
67
68
69
70
71

Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 99-101.
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 68-69.
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their interests to push for accelerated repayment or to accept delayed
repayment or debt-for-equity swaps.72 Large lenders to the firm often have
better information about the distressed firm’s prospects and can
communicate this information to fellow lenders in private negotiations. 73
Because Japanese banks often hold significant proportions of the bonds
issued by their borrowers, 74 it seems plausible that the informational
asymmetries that typically arise between bank lenders and bondholders are
mitigated by the dual role of Japanese banks as lenders and bondholders.
This argument is consistent with Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein’s
finding that distressed firms whose capital structure contains a higher
proportion of debt finance from their largest lender invest more and sell
more than other firms,75 and that the costs of financial distress are higher for
firms with many creditors than for firms with relatively few creditors.76
C.

Trade Creditor-Led Private Liquidations

While private reorganizations were more commonly bank-led, as in
the case of Toyo Kogyo, the trade creditors of the distressed firm often
initiated private liquidations. Extensive reliance on trade credit was a
corollary to long-term business relationships within Japanese supply chains,
and trade creditors often had outstanding accounts receivable from the
distressed firm.77 Business failure of a single firm could send shockwaves
through the delicate networks of trading partners, triggering a chain of
business failures.78 Thus, trade creditors had strong incentive to manage the
orderly liquidation of a distressed trade debtor.
Where bank rescue was not forthcoming–and it was not often
forthcoming in the business failures of small and medium sized enterprises
(“SMEs”)–trade creditors would take the situation into their own hands,
sometimes resorting to self-help measures by seizing the distressed firm’s
assets in midnight raids before organized liquidation proceedings are
initiated.79 Indeed, Packer and Ryser describe a stereotypical SME business
72

Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
Grouse, supra note 24, at 591-92.
75
The Role of Banks, supra note 9, at 86.
76
Id.
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PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 20. Anderson & Makhija find that trade credit comprised the
largest proportion of current liabilities on firm balance sheets between 1980-1992. Anderson & Makhija,
supra note 15, at 314.
78
PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 20 (nearly 20% of Japanese bankruptcies during the observed
period were directly or indirectly attributable to the bankruptcies of related companies).
79
Id. at 21.
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failure, with management fleeing the scene as creditors break into a factory
and pile capital equipment and inventory into trucks.80
While creditor raids were not the norm, they reflect the anxiety among
trade creditors about the prospects of repayment under circumstances in
which negotiated resolution appeared difficult to achieve.81 For their part,
banks rarely participated in private liquidations, instead setting-off
outstanding credits against the distressed firm’s deposits and relying on the
procedure of civil execution to satisfy additional outstanding credits against
the collateralized assets of the firm.82 Banks were vulnerable to the seizure
of collateralized equipment and inventory by unsecured trade creditors, but
foreseeing the risk of asset-stripping, banks preferred to collateralize loans
against real property, which did not bear the risk of loss from trade creditor
raids.83
In fact, private liquidations shared many similarities with the private
reorganization procedure utilized in the Toyo Kogyo case study. In private
reorganizations, the main bank of the distressed firm would call a creditors’
meeting and serve as the de facto chairman, describing the condition of the
distressed firm and proposing a plan for financial restructuring of the firm’s
debts. 84 The appointment of main bank executives to the board of the
distressed firm, as in Toyo Kogyo, served to monitor and discipline
management and incentivize their compliance with the interests of
creditors.85
Similarly, in private liquidations, it was typical for a leading trade
creditor or the distressed debtor to call a creditors’ meeting, at which an
explanation would be given for the business failure of the firm and the
current conditions of the distressed firm and its assets and liabilities would
be presented.86 At this meeting, creditors would select a creditors committee
and appoint a chairman.87 The chairman would solicit and receive letters of
entrustment from the creditors of the firm, and would seek to obtain the
cooperation of the debtor in subsequent creditor meetings.88 The chairman
would oversee the liquidation of three classes of assets: the account
receivables of the distressed debtor; movables, including machines and
80
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Id. at 22.
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Id. at 24.
84
Suzuki & Wright, supra note 4, at 102.
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See Pascale & Rohlen, supra note 28, at 228-30; see also Aoki, Patrick, & Sheard, supra note 5, at
16-20 (discussing bank monitoring of distressed firms).
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inventory; and real property (although real property was usually secured
against bank loans).89
The chairman in a trade creditor-led private liquidation played a role
similar to that of the trustee in a formal bankruptcy proceeding, evaluating
creditors’ claims and overseeing the distribution of proceeds from
liquidation of the firm’s assets.90 The chairman’s role, however, was weaker
than that of a trustee in bankruptcy court in regard to preventing holdout
creditors from disrupting the liquidation process, since the chairman could
neither impose a mandatory stay upon creditors nor rely on voting
mechanisms to force a “clamp-down” on recalcitrant creditors. 91
Additionally, the chairman was dependent upon the good-faith actions of the
distressed debtor in private liquidation; a non-cooperative debtor could hide
or fraudulently convey the assets of the firm, creating obstacles to resolution
that would slow down the liquidation process.92
Despite the difficulties attendant in private liquidation, there were
efficiency advantages in both the size of distribution and the length of
procedure relative to formal liquidation proceedings in court. Packer and
Ryser find that distribution rates in Nagoya and Tokyo were somewhat
higher in private liquidation than in bankruptcy cases.93 The time savings
were more pronounced: private liquidations in Nagoya and Tokyo were on
average five months to one year, while bankruptcy proceedings usually
lasted significantly longer, with 50.3% of all such proceedings concluded in
1989 lasting for more than three years, and 24% lasting for more than five
years.94
Packer and Ryser’s study suggests, however, that some types of
business failures were statistically more likely to go to formal legal
proceedings than others. For instance, debtors in court-based liquidation
cases had nearly 20% larger amounts of outstanding liabilities than debtors
in private liquidations, which suggests either that the transaction costs of
private negotiation increased as the number of creditors of the firm
increased, or that formal proceedings were still necessary to resolve the
thorniest cases.95 Packer and Ryser’s account suggests that, consistent with
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PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 24.
Id. at 25.
Id.
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Judge Easterbrook’s observation, recourse to formal legal processes occurred
more frequently as the costs of negotiated resolution increased.96
D.

Implications

The aforementioned studies of private reorganizations and liquidations
suggest that private resolution of business failure was more likely to succeed
where creditor composition was relatively small and homogenous. In
contrast, where creditors were more numerous and diverse, negotiating costs
were higher and the ability of creditors to avoid formal legal proceedings
was diminished.
Miwa and Ramseyer demonstrate that while creditor composition may
have influenced the preference for market methods over recourse to formal
legal process, bank-led private reorganizations were far from ubiquitous and
often unsuccessful.97 Many firms that sought bank assistance did not receive
it, and many firms that did receive initial bank support were unable to turn
around their performance and eventually failed or were merged into another
firm. 98 The proportion of debt finance in the firm’s capital structure
increased the risk of default, but creditor concentration and main bank
affiliation did not fully hedge against that risk.
In their empirical study, Miwa and Ramseyer found that Japanese
banks made loans to financially distressed firms, but that banks increased
their loan levels to financially distressed firms at a slower rate than to
solvent firms, and that main bank lending to insolvent firms did not
necessarily keep such firms from failing.99 Indeed, their research indicates
that main banks reduced their exposure to financially distressed borrowers,
and that the closer the ties a firm had to a main bank, the greater the cuts in
that bank’s exposure to the borrower following the onset of financial
distress.100 Moreover, Miwa and Ramseyer find that distressed borrowers
switched main bank affiliation as frequently as did solvent firms, suggesting
that firms did not expect their existing main bank to initiate rescue
operations in accordance with an implicit rescue guarantee.101 While further
empirical research is needed, it appears that while bank debt capital
structures and small, homogenous creditor compositions were not
determinative of the approach taken by creditors, these factors nonetheless
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 31.
Miwa & Ramseyer, Conflicts of Interest in Japanese Insolvencies, supra note 11, at 309-15.
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Id. at 321.
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may have influenced the decision to rely on market methods rather than
legal process. As discussed in Part V, the deregulation of Japan’s capital
markets in the 1980s enabled firms to raise capital more widely, with
significant effects on capital structure and creditor composition.
CAPITAL MARKET DEREGULATION, CHANGING CAPITAL STRUCTURES,
AND THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: COLLUSION BETWEEN LAW AND MARKETS
IN THE 1980S

V.

Over the course of the 1980s, large Japanese firms diversified their
capital structures as ongoing deregulation of capital markets enabled them to
raise increasingly large proportions of their capital in domestic and foreigncurrency denominated debt and equity markets.102 A concomitant decline in
the importance of bank finance was observed. A pair of statistics suggests
the speed and scale of the transition in capital structure. Between 1971 and
1975, bank borrowing comprised 84% of all external finance of the large
Japanese firm. From 1981 to 1985, however, bank finance only comprised
57% of total external financing of large Japanese firms.103 In their study of
Japanese corporate balance sheets, Anderson and Makhija find that between
1980 and 1992 trade credit and long-term lending declined substantially as a
proportion of debt, while the proportion of corporate bond-backed financing
nearly quadrupled from 3.3% to 12.5%, and equity finance as a proportion of
assets rose from 19% to 32%.104
This Part discusses the deregulation of Japan’s capital markets
throughout the 1980s and considers the consequences of deregulation for
Japanese banks. This Part concludes by identifying the implications of
deregulation for the private resolution of business failure through the use of
market methods.
A.

Deregulation of Capital Markets

It is important to note that capital market deregulation arose from
much more modest efforts in the late 1970s to ease interest rate restrictions
on Japanese sovereign bonds, as the Government of Japan began to run
budget deficits.105 Previously, no secondary market for Japanese sovereign
bonds existed. Rather, the Ministry of Finance pressured banks to hold lowyielding government bonds, while high growth enabled the Bank of Japan to
102
103
104
105

Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 313.
Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 110.
Anderson & Makhija, supra note 15, at 313-14.
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT, supra note 23, at 13.
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monetize these bonds without risking inflation.106 By 1977, Japanese banks
challenged this policy and demanded the relaxation of interest rate
restrictions on government bonds.107 The government agreed and held its
first public auctions on government bonds in 1978.108
The liberalization of sovereign debt jeopardized the market for
corporate bonds, which were subject to even greater interest rate restrictions
than sovereign bonds, and had persistently delivered below-market returns to
corporate bondholders.109 As other scholars have noted, “it became apparent
that the demand for corporate bonds would have been destroyed by the
liberalization of the government bond market.”110
Japanese regulators responded by easing regulatory restrictions on
corporate bond issuance. While continuing to require that corporate bonds
be fully secured against the assets of the issuer, the government replaced
fixed interest rate ceilings with flexible ceilings adjusted in line with market
conditions and removed interest-rate ceilings altogether on convertible
bonds, and the market for convertibles grew quickly. 111 The next major
reform came in 1980 with the amendment of the Foreign Exchange Law,
which removed traditional impediments to the issuance of foreign-currency
denominated corporate bonds in international capital markets, including
approval by the Bond Committee.112 Under the amended Foreign Exchange
Law, firms were no longer required to seek permission to issue foreigncurrency denominated bonds in overseas capital markets; firms needed only
to provide notice to the Ministry of Finance that they intended to issue such
bonds. 113 More importantly, these bonds had no security requirement,
providing Japanese firms with their first taste of unsecured debt markets and
lowering the entry costs of bond issuance. Japanese firms quickly adapted to
this liberalized debt market environment and raised nearly half of their
capital in overseas bond markets by 1983.114
The government followed these deregulatory measures with the
legalization of warrant bonds in 1981, and the warrant option was made
106

Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 109.
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT, supra note 23, at 13. See also Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap, The
Japanese Banking Crisis: Where Did It Come From and How Will It End?, 14 NBER MACROECON. ANN.
129, 140 (1999) (providing a detailed list of bond-market deregulatory events).
112
Bank Monitoring and Investment, supra note 4, at 109.
113
Id.
114
In fact, a handful of Japanese firms raised capital via Euromarket bond offerings in the early 1970s,
but because of the permission requirements imposed prior to 1980 under the Foreign Exchange Law, few
were able to tap the Euromarket for bond issues prior to deregulation. See Grouse, supra note 24, at 592.
107

JUNE 2013

CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CREDITOR COMPOSITION, & INSOLVENCY

533

detachable from the underlying debt instrument in 1985.115 Warrant bonds,
like convertible bonds, proved popular and the Ministry of Finance
estimated in 1986 that warrant bond issues accounted for over 20% of all
new capital raised.116
Finally, in 1983, the government announced the first move in the most
significant deregulation yet: the relaxation of standards for the issuance of
unsecured corporate bonds. 117 Prior to 1983, only two Japanese firms,
Toyota Automotive and Matsushita Electric, were deemed sufficiently
credit-worthy to issue completely unsecured bonds.118 In January 1983, an
additional nine firms were permitted to issue unsecured straight bonds and
twenty-three firms were permitted to issue unsecured convertible bonds.119
This privilege was steadily expanded to greater numbers of firms throughout
the 1980s. By 1987, 180 firms were permitted to issue unsecured straight
bonds and 330 firms were authorized to issue unsecured convertible
bonds.120 While previous liberalizations of convertible and warrant bonds
had increased the domestic market for Japanese corporate debt, outstanding
security requirements on the issuance of this debt had restricted the issuance
of this debt to the size of the firm’s unsecured assets.
Despite this progressive deregulation of the domestic straight bond
market, the biggest growth throughout the 1980s remained in unsecured
convertible and warrant bonds, accounting for 77.9% of all corporate bond
issuances in 1989.121 First, it is important to note that while many large
firms were capable of issuing unsecured straight bonds by the late 1980s,
this was not true throughout much of the decade. Second, there was
considerable resistance to the liberalization of the unsecured straight bond
market from the Japanese commercial banks that served as corporate bond
trustees under the Secured Corporate Bond Trustee Law.122 Under that law,
Japanese banks were appointed as trustees over the collateral against which
the bond was secured, and were able to charge substantial fees for their
maintenance services.123 It was customary in the Japanese corporate debt
market for trustee banks to bear the risk of loss in place of other
bondholders, buying back bonds in default and then recovering their losses
against the secured corporate debt through private negotiations or formal
115
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insolvency proceedings.124 In this way, informal securities market practices
concentrated claims in the hands of a small number of bank creditors,
reducing the cost of private negotiations. These arrangements also enabled
banks to influence the terms and conditions of bond issuance, since they
were understood by the domestic market to be the ultimate risk-bearers of
risk on default.125
Unsecured straight bonds enabled firms to raise capital without being
subject to collateralization and fee requirements. Banks understood,
however, that unsecured bond issuance coupled with traditional trusteeship
practices threatened to expose them to buyback risk without the provision of
either the maintenance fee cushion or the right to foreclose against collateral
as secured claimholders in case of the default of the issuer upon its
outstanding bonds. Accordingly, banks used their dual powers as trustees
and large lenders to restrict the issuance of unsecured domestic straight
bonds. 126 In 1989, at the peak of the “bubble economy,” Japanese firms
issued only $250 million in domestic unsecured straight bonds, which
amounted to only one-twentieth of the amount of foreign-currency
denominated unsecured straight bonds issued by Japanese firms in overseas
capital markets.127
B.

Consequences of Deregulation for Banks

As the account above suggests, the deregulation of Japan’s capital
markets in the 1980s resulted in changes to the capital structure and creditor
composition of large Japanese firms. Japanese firms capable of issuing
bonds diversified their sources of debt capital and issued bonds in domestic
and overseas capital markets. 128 Deregulation of corporate bond markets
opened the door for large-scale bond issuances, and foreign investors in
particular demonstrated a strong appetite for Japanese bonds. Moreover, the
issuance of large numbers of convertible and warrant bonds in domestic and
overseas debt markets may have eased a great deal of equity into the hands
of domestic and foreign investors; while many more convertible bonds than
straight bonds were issued during the 1980s, the slow growth of convertible
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bonds as a proportion of liabilities suggests that conversion rights were often
exercised.129
The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets also had consequences for
Japanese banks. While banks continued to lend to large Japanese firms, the
growth of non-bank bondholders diversified the creditor composition of
large firms. 130 Banks were accustomed to facilitating negotiations when
firms entered financial distress, but negotiated resolution became more
complex as the number and diversity of creditors increased. Additionally,
banks’ equity stakes in their borrowers may have been diluted by the release
of equity into the market through the exercise of convertible and warrant
bonds.131
As bond trustees, banks stabilized the corporate bond market in case
of issuer default through bond buybacks, but such buybacks posed
significant risks without pre-default collection of maintenance fees and postpurchase security rights against the issuers. Japanese bond investors were
unused to pricing default risk into corporate bond purchases, since issuers
and trustee banks shared the costs of default, and investors received low
interest rates in return for their low risk exposure.132 Bond buybacks by
Japanese banks did not just stabilize bond markets but also protected the
credibility and reputation of Japanese financial intermediaries, to the extent
that even if trustee banks were denied maintenance fees and secured claims
against assets of the issuer, it was difficult for banks to refuse bond
buybacks.133
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C.
Implications of Deregulation for the Private Resolution of Business
Failure
The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets enabled large Japanese
firms to raise increasing proportions of their debt capital in domestic and
foreign bond markets, resulting in the diversification of their capital
structures and the composition of their creditors. 134 As new sources of
capital emerged, bank debt and trade credit became somewhat less
significant sources of external capital, although banks continued to lend
heavily throughout the 1980s. 135 Diversification of creditor composition
may have also had consequences for negotiating dynamics during the private
resolution of business failure, as banks were joined by classes of
bondholders with potentially divergent interests. These developments
occurred during a period of financial exuberance, and the implications of
diversified capital structures and creditor compositions may not have been
readily apparent to banks and borrowers during the 1980s.
In Part IV, this article discusses the challenges that arose during
Japan’s prolonged recession in the 1990s, during which time banks provided
ongoing loan support to distressed borrowers to prevent their insolvency.
Part VI seeks to explain this behavior in light of the barriers to negotiated
resolution of business failure that arose from the diversification of creditor
composition, as well as the existing substantive and procedural defects in
Japan’s insolvency laws.
THE FAILURE OF MARKET METHODS AND LEGAL PROCESS IN THE
RECESSIONARY 1990S

VI.

As the 1990s began, Japan entered a prolonged, deep recession,
triggering sharp declines in asset values, including equities and commercial
real estate investment, while liabilities maintained their bubble-era values.136
This had significant implications for Japanese firms and their creditors.
As explained below, changes in capital structure and creditor
composition raised barriers to negotiated resolution of business failure, and
legal process remained burdensome and costly. Thus, neither market
methods nor legal process provided adequate remedies for creditors seeking
134
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to resolve the near-insolvency of many distressed borrowers. In response,
Japanese banks provided ongoing loan support to distressed borrowers in
order to stave off their insolvency. This Part argues that, despite the seeming
irrationality of continuous bank lending to non-performing borrowers, the
simultaneous failure of market methods and legal process suggests a rational
explanation for this behavior of Japanese banks.
A.

Japanese Banks Provided Loan Support to Distressed Borrowers

Japanese banks were particularly vulnerable to the declining values of
their borrowers’ assets. While bank debt was relatively less important in the
capital structure of Japanese firms, Japanese banks had continued to increase
their loan exposure to Japanese firms throughout the 1980s. Loans were
either explicitly secured against firm assets or were at least made in the
knowledge of the financial health of the borrower.137 As firms struggled to
satisfy their outstanding debt obligations to Japanese banks, the volume of
nonperforming loans (“NPLs”) in banks’ lending portfolios increased. 138
The proliferation of NPLs raised questions as to the adequacy of bank
capital reserve ratios to meet the default risks of their borrowers.139
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that Japanese banks continued
lending to non-performing borrowers, supplying credit throughout the 1990s
to firms that would otherwise have defaulted on their debt obligations and
forced private or legal resolution of their business failure.140 Japanese banks
pursued seemingly irrational lending strategies: increasing the volume of
lending to their most troubled borrowers without increasing the volume of
lending to financially healthy borrowers, and declining to charge risk
premiums on loans to their most troubled borrowers.141
These lending practices had two effects. First, they appeared to
decrease NPLs by enabling Japanese firms to satisfy short-term debt
obligations. Second, they allowed Japanese firms to misrepresent their
capital levels in order to give the appearance of financial health.142 Banks
themselves did not have endless capital to commit to lending to
nonperforming borrowers, and banks were only capable of engaging in this
137

Id. at 40 (ex. 2-1 illustrates rising bank lending to the corporate sector throughout the 1980s as a
percentage of nominal GDP, peaking at 85% during the late 1980s).
138
SCHAEDE, supra note 15, at 36.
139
Dan W. Puchniak, Perverse Main Bank Rescue in the Lost Decade: Proof That Unique
Institutional Incentives Drive Japanese Corporate Governance, 16 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 13, 44 (2007).
140
Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren, Unnatural Selection: Perverse Incentives and the Misallocation of
Credit in Japan, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1144, 1165 (2005).
141
Puchniak, supra note 139, at 36.
142
Id. at 44.
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lending scheme because of low borrowing costs from the Bank of Japan.143
Banks could continue “evergreening” their loans so long as the repayment of
their outstanding credit obligations was more valuable than the costs
incurred by central bank borrowing. 144 I describe these bank lending
practices as “loan support,” to avoid the negative connotations of
“evergreening.”
These lending choices, which scholars have described derisively as
“unnatural selection” or “perverse incentives,” arguably prolonged the depth
and severity of Japan’s recession by preventing otherwise insolvent firms
from defaulting and by delaying structural adjustment.145 Instead, lending
volumes remained large and expanded to nonperforming sectors of the
Japanese economy, which could not be revived to financial health even by
extraordinary fiscal and monetary stimulus.146 Puchniak argues that banks
throughout this period were motivated in large part by the need to meet
minimal capital requirements under Basel I rather than the desire to enhance
profitability.147 The government of Japan helped banks to nominally meet
their Basel-mandated risk-based capital ratios by allowing firms to employ
accounting gimmicks to disguise the true health of their borrowers,
prohibiting banks from disclosing their loan support for distressed
143
Jun Nagayasu, The Term Structure of Interest Rates and Monetary Policy During a Zero Interest
Rate Period, 22 MONETARY & ECON. STUD. 19, 22 (2004). The official discount rate declined from 6.0%
to 0.5% between July 1991 and September 1995. Id. Rates stayed low, between 0.5% and 0.25%, from
1995 to 1998. Id. The Bank of Japan brought short-term interest rates near zero in February 1999 and kept
rates at such levels until June 2006. See Masaru Yoshitomi, Comments on: “Japanese Monetary Policy:
1998-2005 and Beyond” by Takatoshi Ito (BIS Papers No. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap31k.pdf.
144
Puchniak suggests that loan support was likely unprofitable for banks, despite very low borrowing
costs, and that banks were incentivized to take losses by implicit government rescue promises and
regulatory forbearance, and by subsidizing banks through the purchase of subordinate debt at below-market
levels. Puchniak, supra note 139, at 53-56. The implicit rescue hypothesis appears questionable in light of
the failure of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and the mergers between many other banks during the period. Id.
at 54. As a counter-argument, I propose that loan support practices suggested that banks were less
concerned by profitability than with lowering default risk. Peek and Rosengren discuss the “balance sheet
cosmetics” hypothesis, which suggests that “the incentive for a bank to make additional credit available to
troubled firms to which the bank already has loans outstanding increases as the bank’s reported risk-based
capital ratio nears its required capital ratio.” Peek & Rosengren, supra note 140, at 1150.
145
Both negative appellations were taken from the title of Peek and Rosengren’s 2005 article.
146
Puchniak, supra note 139, at 35-36 (finding that industries most heavily affected by the bursting of
the bubble economy, such as real estate and construction, were among the largest loan recipients
throughout the 1990s and increases in loan amounts to troubled borrowers in these industries should be
viewed within a broader portrait of declining lending throughout the 1990s, as corporate borrowing
declined throughout the 1990s). Koo attributes declines in lending to corporate borrower’s lack of demand
for funds, rather than to banks’ unwillingness to lend. KOO, supra note 136, at 46-47.
147
Puchniak, supra note 139, at 45, 47-48 (“Japanese banks found themselves in the unique position
where government regulations and incentives, coupled with their battered balance sheets, made
evergreening, rather than cutting risk loans, a more effective strategy” for meeting their risk-based capital
ratios).
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borrowers, providing reassurance that ongoing loan support would not result
in bankruptcy, and lending capital to financial institutions at below-market
interest rates.148
Peek and Rosengren find that the main bank system, which declined
in significance during the 1980s, re-emerged in the 1990s as a significant
source of loan support to distressed firms.149 Main banks were more likely
than secondary lenders to provide additional loans to troubled borrowers,
and this tendency increased if the primary lender and the troubled firm were
members of the same business group.150 Moreover, the authors’ empirical
findings suggest that government policy identified main banks rather than
other lenders as the appropriate providers of loan support to distressed
Finally, Peek and Rosengren’s studies suggest that
borrowers. 151
government lenders provided direct support to distressed firms with troubled
main banks.152 Thus, government lending policy addressed the problem of
financial distress from the perspectives of both lender and borrower, since
the failure of either the borrower or the lender was likely to trigger a string
of defaults among related parties.153
These studies indicate significant levels of institutional intervention in
the performance of financially distressed Japanese firms in the 1990s by
both major commercial lenders and the Bank of Japan. This institutional
intervention, while preventing or prolonging the occurrence of actual default
by distressed borrowers, has been heavily criticized for creating “zombie
banks” and “zombie firms” which survived throughout the 1990s only by
virtue of nontransparent accounting standards and the flow of lending
enabled by near-zero interest rates and loose monetary and fiscal policies.154

148

Id. at 49-50.
Peek & Rosengren, supra note 140, at 1148 (finding that “the shift to bond finance and away from
bank finance by Japanese firms did not continue during the 1990s even as the bad loan problems at banks
intensified”).
150
Id. at 1161.
151
See Puchniak, supra note 139, at 58 (citing Peek & Rosengren and interpreting their analysis to
“find that government lenders were more likely to increase loans to firms that had troubled main banks . . .
[suggesting] that the government attempted to aid unhealthy main banks that were keeping their promise to
evergreen.”).
152
Id. at 1162.
153
See Packer & Ryser’s findings on the significant number of insolvencies triggered by the
insolvency of related firms. PACKER & RYSER, supra note 53, at 20.
154
See Ricardo J. Caballero, Takeo Hoshi, & Anil K. Kashyap, Zombie Lending and Depressed
Restructuring in Japan, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1943 (2008) (for the argument that loan support to “zombie
firms” delayed restructuring by preventing competitive forces from forcing troubled firms to fire workers
and lose market share).
149
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B.
Loan Support Can Be Explained By the Failure of Market Methods
and Legal Processes.
It seems plausible that the Bank of Japan and Japanese commercial
banks coordinated their policy to provide liquidity to distressed firms and
avoid or postpone the incidence of widespread insolvency. These goals
seem consistent with earlier bank behavior, particularly in light of the
liquidity and cash-flow enhancing effects of bank supervision of distressed
firms.155 It is possible to explain loan support, however, without finding that
Japanese banks operated as implicit rescuers. As Miwa and Ramseyer have
observed, the implicit rescue hypothesis is largely myth and ignores the
influence of rational incentives on the behavior of banks and borrowers.156
In fact, bank behavior was rational under the circumstances. These
circumstances included near-zero interest rates and loose monetary policy,
the failure of market methods to resolve business failure where changes in
capital structure had raised the costs of private negotiations, and substantive
and procedural deficiencies in Japan’s insolvency laws that limited their
utility.
1.
Low Interest Rates and Loose Monetary Policies Enabled Loan
Support
The Bank of Japan’s monetary policies throughout the 1990s kept
interest rates close to zero, enabling commercial banks to borrow from the
central bank at very low cost. The banks providing loan support were
usually major lenders, if not primary lenders, of the distressed firms. It is
likely that these banks had major loan exposure to the distressed firms
receiving loan support, including debt obligations nearing maturity. 157
Default upon such short-term debt obligations would require banks to take
major writedowns on their balance sheets, calling into question the adequacy
of their capital reserves and threatening to throw banks into insolvency.158
155

Morck & Nakamura, supra note 10, at 336.
See Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Does Relationship Banking Matter? The Myth of the
Japanese Main Bank, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 298 (2005) [hereinafter Does Relationship
Banking Matter?].
157
Indeed, Peek and Rosengren suggest that the rationale for providing loan support was precisely to
prevent firms from defaulting on short-term debts owed to the financial institution providing the loan
support. This was done to prevent borrower default, which in turn shielded the bank’s reported risk-based
capital ratio from declining. Peek & Rosengren, supra note 140, at 1165.
158
Id. This phenomenon occurred in 1997, when the failure of Sanyo Securities triggered the
collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, and ultimately the failure of Yamaichi Securities. See Mitsuhiro
Fukao, Recapitalizing Japan’s Banks: The Functions and Problems of Financial Revitalization Act and
Bank Recapitalization Act, 38 KEIO BUS. REV. 1 (2000).
156
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The provision of loan support to distressed borrowers was rational for
banks with significant loan exposure to non-performing borrowers, so long
as the costs of capital from the Bank of Japan were less than the expected
value of debt repayment by the troubled borrower. This mechanism allowed
commercial banks to borrow cheaply, lend this money out to debtors at a
higher rate, and receive some of that loan capital back in return as repayment
of interest and principal on debt obligations nearing maturity. A portion of
this money would go to paying interest rates on the sum borrowed from the
central bank, and a portion might go towards bank expenses or reinvestment.
Loan support provided banks with interest income they would not otherwise
have, and allowed banks to avoid writedowns that might reveal the extent of
their bad debt exposure.
Loan support to distressed firms may have allocated capital
inefficiently to firms that could not make good use of the capital, but this is
precisely the sort of moral hazard invited by ultra-low interest rates and
loose monetary policies.159 Although loan support was highly susceptible to
abuse, the policy was not without its theoretical merits. If banks reinvested
their earnings from loan repayments in higher-return assets that allowed
them to cover residual losses from the NPLs in their loan portfolios, such
policies over time might eventually permit banks to sever their ties with
troubled borrowers once their balance sheets were sufficiently recovered to
bear the losses.160
2.

Loan Support Was Not Provided to All Distressed Borrowers

The existence of loan support did not prevent many financially
distressed firms from entering insolvency in the 1990s. Until the 1990s, the
annual rate of all insolvency filings, including corporate and personal
liquidations and reorganizations, was only 2,254 per year.161 There was a
surge in corporate and personal insolvency filings in the early 1990s, which
led courts to adapt their procedures to accommodate the increased volume of
insolvency filings.162 These internal reforms prompted a second wave of
159
See Adam S. Posen, The Political Economy of Deflationary Monetary Policy, in JAPAN’S
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS PARALLELS TO U.S. EXPERIENCE 194, 206 (Ryoichi Mikitani & Adam S. Posen
eds., 2000), available at: http://www.piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/319/9iie289X.pdf (Bank of
Japan Governor Hayami Masaru spoke frequently of the moral hazards posed by Japan’s zero interest rate
policy).
160
This view is consistent with Miwa and Ramseyer’s argument that Japanese bankers reduced loan
exposure to troubled borrowers where they could, and provided continued loan support only when banks
decide that continued support will enhance the prospects of repayment. See Miwa & Ramseyer, supra note
11, at 338.
161
Anderson, supra note 2, at 3.
162
Id. at 4.
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corporate and personal filings in the mid-1990s. 163 Part IV suggests that
Japanese creditors historically relied on market methods to resolve business
failure because the costs of private negotiation were lower than the costs of
legal proceedings, and that the high costs associated with formal insolvency
proceedings in Japan gave incentives to creditors and distressed firms alike
to resolve failure through private negotiations.
Accordingly, while further empirical work must be done in this area, it
seems reasonable to predict that many more firms were privately
reorganized or liquidated throughout the 1990s than were reorganized or
liquidated through court procedures. A sharp increase in bankruptcy filings
likely represented only a small fraction of total business failures during the
decade. These findings suggest that Japanese banks did not provide lending
support indiscriminately but continued to distinguish firms that possessed
sound prospects for recovery but needed time to reduce debt from firms that
required either reorganization or liquidation. Alternatively, banks might
have targeted lending support to firms to which they had large loan
exposures and allowed firms that posed less risk to banks’ balance-sheet
health to fail. Either explanation is consistent with the claim that the
application of loan support was guided by rational incentives.
3.
Loan Support Did Not Prevent Japanese Firms from Raising Debt
Capital in the Domestic Bond Market
Despite allegations of perverse incentives, loan support likely did not
prevent healthier firms from raising debt capital. Rather, the domestic bond
market remained relatively robust throughout the 1990s, following
commercial law reforms that relaxed debt issuance restrictions and removed
the trustee bank barriers to the issuance of domestic straight unsecured
bonds.164
Under the pre-1993 Commercial Code, Japanese firms were restricted
from issuing public debt beyond either a firm’s capital, cash reserves, or net
assets according to its final balance sheet. 165 As Japanese firms faced
declining asset values, restrictive debt issuance laws threatened to shut many
leveraged firms out of domestic capital markets, forcing Japanese firms to
rely more heavily on overseas capital markets. 166 The 1993 Commercial
Code Reform abolished bond issuance restrictions and reformed the
163
164
165
166

Id.
Grouse, supra note 24, at 589.
Id. at 594.
Id. at 595.
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corporate bond trustee system, lowering barriers to the issuance of domestic
corporate bonds.167 Trustees were replaced by Corporate Bond Management
Companies, which were more limited in the scope of their managerial
powers, enabling securities companies to play a larger role in structuring
bond offerings and reducing bond issuance fees and maintenance fees.168
Following the 1993 Commercial Code Reform, new bond offerings
were largely unsecured straight bonds without implicit buyback guarantees.
While unsecured straight bonds had comprised only 9% of the Japanese
bond market in 1989, they swelled to a whopping 93.2% of the market by
1997169 The volume of domestic bonds issued also increased significantly.
In 1997, $57 billion worth of domestic straight bonds were issued, which
was 190 times greater than the value of such bonds issued in 1989 and six
times greater than the value of all overseas straight bonds issued in 1997.170
The robust domestic market for Japanese bonds suggested that many market
participants, including institutional investors, believed that the repayment
prospects for Japanese corporate debt were sufficiently good to buy
unsecured bonds without conversion or warrant rights.171
An alternative explanation for the growth in the domestic corporate
bond market that is consistent with the unnatural selection or perverse
incentives hypotheses is that the incentives of Japanese banks were so
skewed by policies favoring the bailout of financially distressed firms that
healthy borrowers could not get bank loans on attractive terms. 172 This
explanation has persuasive force, although firms’ preference for bond
finance over bank debt was also manifest during the 1980s, prior to the
recession and the implementation of loan support. Additionally, while
empirical research is needed, it seems plausible that Japanese banks
preferred to diversify their portfolios by buying bonds issued by nondistressed firms, since bonds provided greater liquidity than loans and could
be sold in the market when necessary. The increased issuance of domestic
corporate bonds seems to point to both slackening overseas demand for
167

Id. at 596.
Id. at 597.
169
Id. at 588.
170
Id. at 589 (noting that domestic unsecured straight corporate bonds accounted for 62% of the
Japanese bond market).
171
This latter element may have been more reflective of poor equities performance than the
confidence of bond investors.
172
Puchniak, supra note 139, at 37 (arguing that loan share increased throughout the 1990s to the
worst-performing sectors of the Japanese economy and decreased to Japan’s healthy, export-driven
manufacturing sector). But see KOO, supra note 136, at 46-47 (arguing that this was not due to banks’ lack
of willingness to lend, but to decreased demand by borrowers for loans and increased levels of corporate
savings and debt repayment).
168
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Japanese corporate debt and relatively less favorable terms of bank debt than
bond finance for non-distressed firms. However, it does not appear that loan
support skewed capital allocation such that large, non-distressed firms were
unable to raise debt capital.
4.
Creditor and Stakeholder Composition Continued to Diversify
Throughout the 1990s, Potentially Raising Barriers to the Negotiated
Resolution of Business Failure
The continued diversification of creditors and shareholders of the
Japanese firm throughout the 1990s, including the growth of foreign
institutional investors, may have raised barriers to the negotiated resolution
of business failure, discouraging Japanese banks from making use of market
methods. As discussed below, foreign institutional investors brought new
perspectives that frequently placed them in tension with both firm
management and Japanese banks.
Ahmadjian and Robbins characterize the rising influence of foreign
institutional investors in the Japanese equity market during the 1990s as a
conflict between the stakeholder and shareholder governance.173 As Western
institutional investors, including pension funds and mutual funds, took
portfolio stakes in Japanese firms, they favored downsizing and asset
divestiture to constrain bloated cost structures, often placing them in conflict
with incumbent management.174
Japanese business leaders had long focused on diversification and
corporate growth, prioritizing growth over profitability and demonstrating
relatively little interest in maximizing share price for the benefit of
investors.175 Long-term cross-shareholdings, declined in the 1980s as the
exercise of convertible and warrant bonds diluted the value of such
shareholdings, and continued to diminish in the 1990s as banks sold off their
cross-shareholdings to streamline their stock portfolios. Japanese trading
partners in cross-shareholdings also sold equity stakes. 176 As banks and
trading partners liquidated their positions, traditionally passive shareholders
were replaced by foreign institutional investors seeking bargains in
depressed Japanese stocks who demanded that firm management deliver
higher returns on capital.177
173
Christina L. Ahmadjian & Gregory E. Robbins, A Clash of Capitalisms: Foreign Shareholders
and Corporate Restructuring in 1990s Japan, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 451, 452 (2005).
174
Id. at 453, 457.
175
Id. at 454.
176
Id. at 457.
177
Id.
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Foreign shareholders exercised influence not just by increasing their
stakes in Japanese firms, but by actively participating in shareholder
governance, attending annual meetings and demanding that management
listen to their ideas.178 Moreover, foreign investors exercised their right to
exit, trading actively and influencing share prices. 179 While foreign
investors held only 10% of publicly traded shares, they executed 30% of
stock trades, a figure that further increased to nearly 40% in 1999, and
Japanese institutional investors often followed trading patterns initiated by
foreign shareholders.180
In addition to being confronted by foreign shareholders, firm
managers were confronted by domestic and foreign bondholders, including
municipal governments, institutional funds, and individual investors. Like
foreign shareholders, these large and diverse classes of creditors had varying
interests and appetites for risk. These new classes of bondholders and
shareholders were different from the relatively concentrated and
homogenous bank creditors whose sophistication, aligned interests, and
similar concern for reputational costs facilitated private negotiation.
Just as Japanese managers were unaccustomed to being confronted by
activist shareholders seeking board representation or influence over the
business activities of the firm, Japanese commercial banks were
unaccustomed to the participation of large and unruly classes of creditors or
share sell-offs by institutional investors as firms approached financial
distress. Bank creditors were accustomed to negotiating with each other
over the fate of distressed debtors and may have had reputational incentives
not to block a compromise lest they suffer a similar fate when their major
borrower was financially distressed. In contrast, bondholders had no
incentive to cooperate with bank creditors and strong incentives to force
secured bank creditors to accept losses on their claims. Foreign institutional
investors were more willing than Japanese shareholders to engage in crossshareholdings to sell their stakes in distressed firms, trading sufficient
volumes to force Japanese institutional investors to sell off their holdings as
well.181
To Japanese banks concerned with facilitating private negotiations,
increasingly expensive and difficult creditor negotiations and opportunistic
foreign shareholders may have provided powerful incentive to prevent their
major borrowers from entering financial distress by providing loan support.
178
179
180
181
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Loan support would not necessarily save distressed borrowers, but it could
postpone default indefinitely and provide a distressed firm with breathing
room and a chance to reverse its fortunes. Using loan support to postpone
private resolution of business failure resulted in financing costs for banks
and borrowers alike, but these costs could plausibly be tolerable if creditor
negotiations were anticipated to yield even greater costs for banks and firm
management.
Since creditors could push failing negotiations into insolvency
proceedings, the costs of negotiating the resolution of business failure were
unpredictable. It is thus unsurprising that banks might sometimes choose to
incur the predictable financing costs of loan support, rather than incur the
uncertain costs of negotiation with large and diverse classes of creditors. It
is equally unsurprising that management of distressed firms might
sometimes accept loan support, rather than brave unpredictable negotiations
and the possibility of dismissal if creditors tired of negotiations and pushed
the firm into involuntary bankruptcy.
It appears that Japanese banks used loan support as a postponement
tactic, the desirability of which arose from banks’ concerns that private
negotiations would diminish their prospects of debt repayment, as
bondholders demanded at least partial recovery of their loss. Where banks
could no longer reliably control negotiation outcomes, banks used loan
support to allow distressed borrowers to stay in business and pay down their
outstanding debts. For banks, loan support was rational and maximized their
repayment prospects. The financing costs of providing loan support were
low throughout the 1990s, while the barriers to achieving their repayment
goals in private negotiations were higher than before.
As discussed above, low interest rates and loose monetary policies
enabled Japanese banks to borrow cheaply from the Bank of Japan and
provide loan support to distressed borrowers. The simultaneous failure of
market methods and legal processes gave banks rational incentives to do so,
rather than bear the uncertainty and costs of negotiated resolution or formal
insolvency proceedings.
In order to change banks’ incentives, however, the central bank had to
raise borrowing costs for banks until loan support became too costly to
prolong, or until the conditions causing either market failure or legal failure
were resolved. In Part VII, I argue that major reforms in Japanese
bankruptcy laws addressed substantive and procedural defects in Japan’s
insolvency laws and provided Japanese creditors with a streamlined and less
costly alternative to private negotiations, enabling Japanese creditors to use
formal legal proceedings to resolve many business failures between 2000

JUNE 2013

CAPITAL STRUCTURE, CREDITOR COMPOSITION, & INSOLVENCY

547

and 2003. Legal reforms reduced the expected costs of insolvency
proceedings relative to the costs of loan support or private negotiation such
that creditors and debtors demonstrated a growing preference for legal
processes over the market methods available to them.
VII. INSOLVENCY LAW REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY
Despite an initial wave of insolvency filings in the early 1990s,
Japanese courts and legal scholars recognized that the existing insolvency
laws were costly, procedurally inefficient, and impeded the timely resolution
of business failure. 182 As discussed in this Part, the Japanese legal
community–including judges, academics, and practitioners–undertook
significant reforms of Japan’s insolvency law and court procedures in order
to remove substantive and procedural barriers to the use of formal
insolvency proceedings. Post-reform filing statistics suggest that these
reforms removed significant barriers to the use of legal process to resolve
business failure.
A.

Development and Implementation of Insolvency Law Reforms

Japanese judges first implemented an internal reform of court
procedures in the mid-1990s, which resulted in a second wave of insolvency
filings as Japanese creditors sought to work through another group of deeply
distressed borrowers.183 However, some of the most significant obstacles to
the use of legal process, including the gatekeeping mechanisms and
trusteeship reorganization requirements, remained in place.184
Despite initial procedural reforms, use of insolvency proceedings
remained somewhat tepid. As discussed previously, loan support might
account in part for creditors’ reluctance to rely on legal process. Banks had
strong incentives to use loan support to slowly ease bad debt off their books,
and many distressed firms likely postponed restructuring or liquidation given
the availability of loan support.185 Periodic waves of insolvency filings may
have reflected creditors’ interest in formally resolving business failure, but
the transience of such waves suggested that creditors’ disappointment with
legal process led them to fall back on either loan support or market methods.
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Anderson, supra note 2, at 4.
Id.
184
Id. at 11-12.
185
Id. at 4. This was described in the Japanese press as the “bad debt problem” (furyō saiken mondai)
and was attributed in part to the inefficiencies and costs associated with insolvency proceedings. Id.
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In the face of these structural barriers to the use of legal process,
voices within the Japanese legal community advocated for insolvency law
reform in order to reduce the costs associated with insolvency proceedings
and give creditors incentives to use the courts.186 The government of Japan
formed an insolvency reform subcommittee of the Judicial System
Deliberative Council, comprised largely of legal academics and
practitioners. 187 This subcommittee set a goal of reforming and
consolidating Japan’s insolvency laws into three procedures:
Civil
188
Rehabilitation, Corporate Reorganization, and Bankruptcy.
The subcommittee focused its attention first upon Civil Rehabilitation,
which was previously known as Composition (wagi).
The Civil
Rehabilitation Act was enacted on April 1, 2000, and retained many of the
core components of the Composition procedure. It was a reorganization
procedure that applied to both personal and corporate insolvency, it left the
debtor partially in control, and it did not extend to secured interests.189
The Civil Rehabilitation Act made several major alterations to the preexisting Composition procedure. First, the pre-application screening of the
debtor by the court, previously a strict gatekeeping mechanism that
threatened to push many debtor-in-possession reorganizations into
trusteeship proceedings, was reduced to a nominal review by the court.190
This change mitigated the debtor firm’s incentives to gamble with the assets
of the firm or take on additional debt to prevent entering insolvency, since
Civil Rehabilitation would not necessarily result in the immediate dismissal
of firm management.
The Civil Rehabilitation procedure also allowed the court upon
application to impose a stay over secured creditors and even authorized the
court to strip creditors of their security interests.191 The stay provisions may
have altered the negotiation dynamics between secured and unsecured
creditors when an insolvency filing was considered, preventing secured
creditors from foreclosing on collateral and raiding the firm’s assets while
unsecured creditors negotiated the terms of the reorganization. The
imposition of the stay gave unsecured creditors a greater voice in
186
187
188
189

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6. See also Shinjiro Takagi, Restructuring in Japan, 12 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 1 (2003).
Anderson, supra note 2, at 7. Minji saisei ho [Civil Rehabilitation Act], Law No. 225 of 1999

(Japan).
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Anderson, supra note 2, at 7.
Takagi, supra note 188, at 4 (while a secured creditor can enforce its secured rights, a debtor is
eligible a temporary stay order prohibiting enforcement of that secured right for a certain period; also,
secured rights cannot be extinguished without the consent of the secured creditor unless the debt has been
paid in full).
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reorganization proceedings and more closely aligned the incentives of
secured and unsecured creditors, encouraging them to reach a mutually
satisfactory compromise. This was particularly significant where bank
creditors held security interests in the assets of the distressed firm and
bondholders were almost entirely unsecured.192
In addition to these substantive reforms, the Civil Rehabilitation Act
furthered internal reforms made by courts throughout the 1990s in enhancing
procedural efficiency, lowering time and costs associated with filing. 193
Anderson argues that these procedural reforms had a major impact on the
success of formal reorganization proceedings, accelerating the pace of
reform and reducing the ability of creditor and the debtor management to
engage in holdup tactics that might deplete firm value and result in the loss
of valuable opportunities for reform.194 Creditor-imposed delays could not
only raise the costs of insolvency procedures, but could also prevent
distressed firms from raising capital, making investments, and retaining
market position, which potentially diminished the firms’ prospects for
recovery.195
Most importantly, the Civil Rehabilitation Act galvanized creditors
and debtors to file for insolvency at record-breaking levels. While annual
corporate insolvency filings in the 1990s numbered in the hundreds, there
were 10,000 filings in 2002 alone, and nearly all of these filings were under
the Civil Rehabilitation Act. 196 While the Civil Rehabilitation Act was
intended to facilitate reorganizations for small and medium-sized
enterprises, large firms also made use of the law.197 Despite the exclusion of
secured creditors from court proceedings, large corporate debtors and their
creditors valued the reduced scrutiny and quick resolution of insolvency and
became primary users of the Civil Rehabilitation procedure.198
192

Id. Takagi addresses other changes in the Civil Rehabilitation Act, including mitigation of the
majority requirement, court permits for sale of the debtor’s business, and the reduction of capital without
shareholders’ resolutions. Id. A reorganization plan may only alter the rights of unsecured creditors if it is
accepted by a simple majority of creditors holding more than half of the total amount of unsecured claims
outstanding. Id. Government and state-owned financial institutions, which usually have large numbers of
claims, are reluctant to accept plans that alter their claims. Id. The consent standards for the alteration of
secured creditors’ claims are still very high but were reduced to a bare majority level for unsecured claims.
Id. Under the revised Civil Rehabilitation Act, courts can permit the sale of all or part of a firm’s business
without a shareholder’s resolution, and can reduce an insolvent firm’s capital without a shareholder’s
resolution. Id. A shareholder’s resolution is still required, however, to raise capital. Id.
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Following the enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act, the
subcommittee reformed the Corporate Reorganization Act and the
Bankruptcy Act in April 2003 and January 2005, respectively. 199 The
Corporate Reorganization Act retained all the basic features of the previous
procedure. It was a trustee-driven reorganization procedure including both
secured and unsecured creditors, any plan under which required a majority
vote of all participating creditors.200 While the Corporate Reorganization
Act did include some procedural innovations, such as a quick approval
process for the sale of assets and lien-stripping, few cases appear to have
been filed under the Corporate Reorganization Act.201
Similarly, the revised Bankruptcy Act largely preserved existing
Japanese liquidation procedures, with some refinements to enhance
procedural speed and enable the consolidation of parent-subsidiary
liquidations for the benefit of creditors. 202 As with the Corporate
Reorganization Act, filings under the Bankruptcy Act appear to have been
few in number.203
B.

Consequences of Insolvency Law Reform

It appears that the most significant consequence of Japan’s insolvency
law reforms was the stark increase in the number of corporate filings under
the Civil Rehabilitation Act. The provisions for debtor-in-possession
reorganization, exclusion of secured creditors, and procedural efficiencies
appear to have overcome some of the most implacable obstacles to the
utilization of legal process by creditors and debtors. The possibility of
retaining firm management during the reorganization process may have
reduced management’s incentive to avoid insolvency at any cost, even at the
risk of destroying firm value and diminishing recovery for creditors of the
firm.
The exclusion of secured creditors from the Civil Rehabilitation
process was also significant, since this could plausibly reduce the risk of
holdup by secured creditors and facilitate compromise among unsecured
bondholders. 204 By dividing secured and unsecured creditors and only
199

Id. at 11-12. Kaisha kōsei hō [Corporate Reorganization Act], Law No. 172 of 1952 (Japan) (as
amended by Law No. 154 of 2002); Hasan Hō [Bankruptcy Act], Law No. 71 of 1922 (Japan) (as amended
by Law No. 75 of 2004).
200
Anderson, supra note 2, at 12.
201
Id. at 11-12; Takagi, supra note 188, at 6-7 (proposing that the lack of a “debtor in possession”
system was responsible for low levels of interest in using the corporate reorganization procedure).
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Id. at 16.
204
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requiring unsecured creditors to approve the reorganization plan, the Civil
Rehabilitation procedure minimized the conflicts of interest between
dissimilar creditor classes that could arise in negotiated resolution. 205
Finally, the reduced costs and expedited pace of Civil Rehabilitation
proceedings likely lowered the barriers to filing and reduced the risk that
distressed firms would stagnate further during lengthy insolvency
proceedings.206
In contrast, the apparently low rates of creditor utilization of
Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy procedures may indicate that
these procedures did not align creditor and debtor interests as successfully,
or that these procedures did not offer an additional value to creditors not
already realized by Civil Rehabilitation procedures. Timing could also be a
significant factor: the processing of tens of thousands of Civil Rehabilitation
filings during the first years of the new century indicates creditors’ pent-up
demand for cost-effective legal process, but by the 2003 enactment of the
Corporate Reorganization Act, corporate insolvency filings were already
easing from their peak in 2002. While further empirical work is needed
here, it seems possible that the unprecedented and prolonged surge of
corporate insolvencies between 2000 and 2003 resolved a significant portion
of the outstanding distressed corporate debt.
Changes in accounting standards and balance sheet consolidation
under the 1998 financial reforms may have galvanized creditors to push their
distressed debtors into Civil Rehabilitation, since creditors could no longer
disguise their NPL exposure.207 Distressed firms could no longer hide asset
devaluations on their books under mark-to-market accounting standards.208
Changes in accounting standards that increased the visibility of loan
support, while reducing its effectiveness in masking bad debt, likely
prompted creditors to push distressed firms into insolvency proceedings, but
reforms in insolvency law likely mattered as well. Moreover, while the main
providers of loan support were major bank lenders with security interests in
the assets of the firm, secured creditors could be excluded altogether from
Civil Rehabilitation proceedings on application, allowing the court to
consider the interests of unsecured creditors.209
205
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Accounting changes were most likely to imperil the lending
relationships between main banks and their distressed borrowers, but main
banks were not the beneficiaries of Civil Rehabilitation. Rather, the Civil
Rehabilitation Act may have enabled unsecured creditors to push distressed
firms into insolvency without risking depletion of firm value by secured
lenders.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While further empirical work is necessary in order to strengthen and
validate the tentative findings of this article, this account is intended to
identify possible relationships between capital structure and creditor
composition on the one hand, and the choice between market methods and
legal process as a means of resolving business failure on the other.
Concentrated firm capital structures and small, relatively homogenous
groups of secured bank creditors appear to have produced conditions under
which private negotiation of business failure was perceived as an adequate
remedy and relatively more desirable than reliance on legal process. The
availability of adequate market methods likely reduced the demand for legal
process, obviating the need to address procedural and substantive defects in
Japan’s insolvency laws. The deregulation of Japan’s capital markets
enabled firms to reorganize their capital structures, increasing the number
and diversity of creditors and likely weakening the influence of bank
creditors. This article suggests that changes in capital structure and creditor
composition may have created barriers to the negotiated resolution of
business failure, necessitating the availability of adequate and effective legal
process. Yet without reform, Japan’s insolvency laws remained ill-suited to
use by creditors.
The onset of a severe and prolonged recession in the 1990s revealed
the challenges of resolving business failure under circumstances in which
neither market methods nor legal process offered effective remedies for
creditors and distressed firms. Loan support enabled banks and firms to
indefinitely stave off insolvency and seemingly emerged as a rational, albeit
undesirable, strategy in the 1990s for lack of better options.
Finally, the enactment of the Civil Rehabilitation Act in 2000 may
have broken the deadlock imposed by the simultaneous failure of market
methods and legal process. This Act resolved substantive and procedural
obstacles to the use of legal process, enabling unsecured creditors
disadvantaged by loan support to protect their interests and force the
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resolution of business failure. In the years that followed, tens of thousands
of distressed firms were restructured under the Civil Rehabilitation Act.
If a larger theme may be wrought from the limited scope of this text it
is that, contrary to perceptions of stagnation and reluctance to modernize
(most recently in the context of the Olympus corporate governance
scandal210), Japan’s business system has demonstrated dynamism in the face
of legal change, including the deregulation of Japan’s capital markets in the
1980s and the reform of the country’s insolvency laws at the beginning of
the new century.
The narrative of “Japan Inc.” as a bastion of
conservatism 211 is dangerous when it distracts scholars and policymakers
from evidence that Japanese firms are responsive to incentives and adaptive
to changes in the legal environment. This Article suggests that targeted legal
reform may have a significant role to play in the revitalization of Japan’s
economy, particularly where market methods no longer offer efficient
solutions to increasingly complex problems.
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